Atty. Sri Suparyati is the head of the Advocay Department of KontraS, As a lawyer, she appeared before the President of Indonesia, the Chief of Indonesian Police, the District Police of Kotawaringin Timur, Governor of Central Kalimantan and District Office of Kotawaringin, Timur on the issue of ethnic conflict in Sampit, Central Kalimantan and in citizens’ lawsuit of migrant workers in Nunukan. She participated in a fellowship program in Transitional Justice in the University of Cape Town, South Africa.
From our year-end reflections for 2004, the Commission for Involuntary Disappearance and Victims of Violence (KontraS) wishes to state that the year 2004 was a dark year for human rights. Various efforts in the human rights struggle found a dead-end, while some even marked a declining trend. The state’s low level of political will and the elite’s narrow interests have dampened the victims’ hope for justice. At the fourth quarter of 2004, the seemingly desperate and pessimistic found new hope from the 2004 elections. However, its real implications still need to be examined until the end of 2005 considering the recent heavy burden of the state.
As an early forecast for 2005, KontraS views this year as an approaching period of long-term human rights and humanitarian crises. Any hope for better human rights protection and promotion would be pushed aside if the political system and the state’s legal structure fail to function as they should. Nevertheless, there is still hope for 2005, as long as the people themselves initiate to remedy the impending humanitarian and human rights crises. Such action could even firm up human rights on a much wider scope. Therefore, the year 2005 could be considered as the Year of Brotherhood and Sisterhood.
This reflection and forecast are the animating forces of the Indonesian human rights community in its continuing fight for justice. This essay is significant in determining the effort and the strategy for achieving justice in 2005.
The Year 2004 was a year when the state institutions mandated to uphold human rights—namely the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas-HAM), the Office of the Attorney General, the courts, the People’s Representatives Council (DPR), the Minister of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, as well as the Office of the President—became paralyzed.
Until the end of 2004, previous cases of human rights violations were left untouched by the state. The above-mentioned institutions also failed to act as a firm bridge for the victims‘ efforts in searching for justice due to legal/procedural excuses, bureaucratic politics and their pass-the-buck attitude. Appeals and pressure from the international community were also neglected. Meanwhile the victims had to wait in a very uncertain situation and witnessed how the state created legal and political means to provide impunity for the perpetrators.
In 2004, there was no state initiative to establish substantial democracy, ensure law enforcement and guarantee human rights protection and promotion. On the contrary, last year was the year when the perpetrators of humanitarian crimes were released. It marked the beginning of the failure of reconciliation efforts. This was due to the lack of sincerity and political will to reveal the truth. This was evident in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or (KKR) which has been practically transformed into a kind of amnesty commission.
In an effort to reveal past crimes of the state and its agents, the creation of the KKR was supposed to be part of a working agenda for the first 100 days of the new Indonesian government. It has to be set up not later than March of this year. So far, current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has already created a selection committee to search for possible members of the Commission.1
The political murder of Munir was the most concrete case of the continued existence of the country’s repressive system and the use of new forms of terror. This method was also used to “handle” labor rights defender Marsinah, the journalist Udin, Acehnese activist Jaffar Sidig, DPR member Teungku Nashiruddin Daun, the Rector of IAIN Ar-Rainiry and the Rector of Unsyiah of Aceh. Included in the repression were the murder and kidnapping of Theys Elluay and Aristoteles Masoka and many other cases involving human rights defenders.
In the course of the on-going conflicts in Aceh and West Papua, the Year 2004 showed some kind of transition from darkness and crises to genuine popular solidarity. These two provinces found no clear hope for peace, with the prospects becoming even more uncertain due to increased military operations. But the natural disaster that struck at the end of 2004 brought to the fore two (2) realities: first, the long-term human rights and humanitarian crises; and second, the awakenened concern of humankind that has long been awaited by the Acehnese people for such a long time.
Unfortunately, in spite of the tumult generated by the Acehnese disaster, hostilities between the Indonesian Army (TNI / Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM / Gerekan Aceh Merdeka) continued. Such actions must cease, for it could disturb the humanitarian and relief efforts in Aceh. Given this consideration, political reconciliation in terms of ceasefire and political agreement between the government of Indonesia and GAM is urgently required.
Some of the reasons why a ceasefire is needed are the following:
1. to secure Aceh’s rehabilitation and reconstruction processes;
2. to guarantee the security of civilians in the aftermath of the natural disaster, most especially of women and children;
3. to guarantee the safety of civilian volunteers as well as foreign military personnel, who might become victims in the armed conflict between the Indonesian military and GAM.
Roots of Repression
To a great extent, the root cause of human rights violations in Indonesia can be traced to the very central role of the military in Indonesian politics which has gained prominence ever since the independence struggle against the Dutch colonizers. On the one hand, since its earliest stages, the movement for national liberation has been characterized by an open reliance on armed resistance and extra-legal tactics.
The centrality of the armed component in the overall campaign for freedom became even more pronounced during the Second World War. This conflict was a turning point of sorts for Indonesian nationalists. It prompted Sukarno, the country’s first president and respected founding father, to declare independence on 17 August 1945 shortly after the surrender of Japan and victory of the Allies. Indonesia, however, would have to wait for another four years for the complete pullout of the Dutch colonial army—an interregnum marked by military skirmishes and bloody uprisings.
The significant role which the newly created army played during the National Revolution paved the way for its repeated intervention in political affairs. Its influence exponentially increased over the years. By the 1960s, the armed forces had already become one of the three (3) power players in Indonesian politics—the other two being the three-million strong Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI ) - Communist Party of Indonesia) and Sukarno himself.
The military first demonstrated its power in 1959 when, under pressure from the General Staff, Sukarno was forced to disband the Constituent Assembly and nullify the 1950 Constitution in favor of the earlier Charter adopted in 1945. This move, however, effectively ended Indonesia’s experiment with constitutionalism and practically assured the future violation of human rights under the guise of national security.
The military’s political role was further buttressed through the Pancasila2—the official ideology of the Indonesian state. This was first elaborated by Sukarno on 1 June 1945 in a speech given before the Investigating Committee on Indonesian Independence. As an ideology, Pancasila contains five (5) inseparable and interrelated principles, namely:
- Ketuhanan (monotheism or belief in One Supreme God)
- Kebangsaan (nationalism or protection of the unity of Indonesia)
- Kemanusiaan (humanism or internationalism)
- Kerakyatan (representative government or democracy)
- Keadilan Sosial (social justice)
Moreover, Pancasila’s emphasis on the attainment of “key” national goals such as national stability, security and order are enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This mandate is held so sacrosanct that any threat or infraction is answered with “firm measures” by the state.
To make matters worse, despite the state’s alleged commitment to democracy and political openness, it is the Executive Department and the military that interpret the nation’s goals and priorities. More often than not, Pancasila’s stress on stability and security have been used to justify the curtailment of civil liberties and human rights and provided impunity for the perpetrators of these abuses.
Through the years, the state has vigorously promoted the Pancasila through strict and rigorous ideological conditioning. Since 1978, government employees from the ranks have been required to attend an obligatory training activity dubbed as the “Pancasila Indoctrination Course.”
In 1985, Law No. 8 was passed which required all social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole determining ideology. It also provided severe penalties for any criticism or deviation from this state-sponsored ideology. Due to its very stringent provisions, this legal measure initially provoked an avalanche of protests from various religious groups and human rights organizations. In response, the ruling Suharto regime arrested the protesters, meting out long prison sentences.
Riding on the Crest of Military Success
Ironically, despite the myth of the military’s preeminent role in the county’s independence struggle, it was a former officer in the Dutch colonial army named Suharto who was able to fully maximize the political function of ABRI (Angkatan Bersanjata Republik Indonesia / Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). Wresting power from Sukarno on the pretext of preempting an impending PKI coup, Suharto oversaw the murder and detention of around 500,000 to one million actual and suspected left-wing activists. Of those who were imprisoned, only 1,000 people were formally charged in court.
The military‘s intervention was justified under the dwi fungsi (dual function) concept, wherein ABRI’s role was not limited to national defense but also acted as the nation’s foremost guarantor of stability and was empowered to carry out various political, economic and social responsibilities.
From then on, the military became the most dominant institution in Indonesia, with a large number of representatives in the country’s two legislative bodies—the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the People’s Representative Council (DPR).
The dual role of the military was further given legal support through Law No. 20 entitled “The Fundamental Law for National Defense and Security” which took effect in September 1982.
In most instances, human rights violations by the military occur in the context of anti-insurgency operations. In Aceh for instance, before the province was stuck by natural calamity on 26 December 2004 in the form of a tsunami, it was already suffering from a human-made disaster brought about by the conflict between the military and the separatist GAM. To address this situation, Aceh was placed under DOM (Military Operational Zone) from 1989 to 1998. Unfortunately, this highly stringent military measure led to the disappearance of 5,000 people, not to mention the 3,000 cases of custodial killings and 128 cases of rape. According to reports, most of these atrocities were carried out by Army elements, the most notorious of which was Kopassus (Army Special Forces) which, at that time, was headed by Suharto’s son-in-law Gen. Prabowo Subianto.
The most tragic aspect of this continuing nightmare is the fact that most of the victims of involuntary disappearances were neither members of GAM nor sympathizers of the said rebel group. In most cases, the victims were male, and aged between 20-45 years old.
From 1996-1998, at the height of the student protest movement against Suharto’s New Order regime, there were around 23 cases of student disappearances. Those who eventually resurfaced told tales of torture and intimidation, and the threat of punitive action if ever they would divulge their experiences with their captors.
Projections for 2005
The challenge for those who work for human rights is getting heavier. Based on its reflection for 2004, KontraS seeks to bring to the public’s attention the tragedy in Aceh-Sumut as a means of ensuring human rights protection in 2005. The process of human rights promotion has to be accelerated so that it will no longer be in a dark room, subject to speculations and political transactions among the country’s elite. It would be such a pity if this year, human rights will continue to be utilized as an ammunition by the different political factions and perpetrators to attack their opponents, instead of using these as a touchstone of governance and a normative aspect of national life.
Psychological / attitudinal changes among people could turn 2005 into the Year of Brotherhood and Sisterhood. With this in mind, the following action points must be undertaken to achieve the above-mentioned goal:
First, to minimize the repressive approach used by the security apparatus in policy execution, most especially in conflict and post-conflict areas to avoid the emergence of social problems such as poverty, damage to infrastructure and public facilities, declining educational level and public health, as well as high levels of hostility among the people.
In handling social conflict, the state has to avoid the rise of ethno-nationalism in all areas, due to heightened military operations which will only trigger the demand for separatism. The policy of martial law is highly questionable, since it prevents the Acehnese and Papuans from rendering full trust on the central government.
The state is expected to handle conflicts by thinking of long-term efforts instead of instant and symbolic actions. The reemergence of terror and violence in post-conflict areas in 2004 compels us to evaluate whether the existing conflict resolution approaches have been done in an appropriate way, that is, by involving the wider community and by disclosing the misuse of equipment such as explosive materials and ammunition.
Secondly, the state should see to it that the safety of human rights defenders is its responsibility. This protection is not merely for activists, but also for all individuals and groups who are willing to promote human rights without resorting to violent means. If only the legal systems were properly functioning, this kind of extra-protection would not be needed. The government could learn from the experience of other countries such as in the European Union (EU), where they have set up Guidelines for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Thirdly, the state has to have the willingness to resolve the past cases of human rights violations. If violations continue, the law becomes a mere mechanism or instrument, deprived of the soul of justice (raison d’etre). There is an adage which says, “justice delayed, justice denied.” Delaying state accountability would mean betrayal of humanity itself.
Fourthly, especially for Aceh and Papua, the state has to prioritize reconciliation efforts with GAM. Along with the ongoing short-term social and psychosocial rehabilitation agenda for the children of Aceh, a more lasting opportunity for peace must be explored by granting some sort of political concessions with GAM.
Footnotes
1 Jaknew.com, 17 January 2005
2 Pancasila comes from the Sanskrit words panca (five) and sila (principle) which literally mean “five principles.”
